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iv

ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Covev has fulfilled the technical requirements of Rule 24(a).
Ms. Covey has suggested that this Court should pass on all of Mr. Covey's issues

because of his alleged failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 24(a). Mr. Covey
has indicated by citation, for each issue presented, where in the record that issue was
preserved for appeal; these record citations were set forth in Mr. Covey's Brief of
Appellant in the "Statement of Facts" section and/or in the section arguing each issue.
Thus, his arguments are "explicitly tied to the record" as required by West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), which Ms. Covey cites in
her brief (Appellee's Br. at 3.)
Rule 24 requires only substantial compliance; as this Court has said, briefs are
adequate under Rule 24 and permit meaningful appellate review as long as they "comply
with the briefing requirements [of Rule 24] sufficiently to enable us to understand what
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, and
why, under applicable authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or
other relief." Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (internal
alterations omitted); see also Harris v. IESASSOCS., Inc., 2003 UT App 112, f51, 471
Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (considering appellate issue on its merits even though requirements of
Rule 24(a)(5) were not met). Mr. Covey's opening brief clearly meets this standard.
Furthermore, these technical errors are cured herein by Exhibit "A", which is attached and

1

which sets forth a "Summary of Arguments" as required by Rule 24(a)(8), and Exhibit
"B"3 which is attached and which sets forth record citations where each issue was
preserved.
In any event, an appellate court may address an issue raised for the first time on
appeal if the appellant establishes that the trial court committed plain error, if there are
exceptional circumstances, or, in some situations, if a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied,
931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). The errors alleged by Mr. Covey in his Brief of Appellant and
herein were plain.
II.

Ms. Covey suggests improper standards of review in her Brief of Appellee.
(A)

Whether "waiver" of jury trial was incorrect turns on a question of

statutory construction. The trial court's decision that Mr. Covey waived his right to a
jury trial was based entirely on its incorrect interpretation of Rules 38(d) and 39(a), Utah
R0 Civ. Po No one disputed the facts; so the trial court's "discretion" to accept and reject
certain facts in making its decision is not what is being challenged, and the case cited by
Ms. Covey, Aspenwood, L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C. (2003 UT App. 285 ^[33, 466 Utah Adv.
Rep. 7), does not apply. The proper standard of review is a correctness standard.
(B)

Whether the trial court correctly rejected Mr. Covey's affirmative

defenses turns on an issue of contract interpretation. Mr. Covey's argument that the
Agreement anticipated any failure to return the securities is a simple question of contract

2

interpretation. Contrary to Ms. Covey's suggestion (Appellee's Br. at 4-5), Mr. Covey
does not ask this Court to review any of the trial court's Findings of Fact to answer this
question,1 The issue of whether the trial court misinterpreted basic terms of the
Agreement is clearly a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
(C)

Whether a duty to mitigate existed turns on a question of law. Ms.

Covey attempts to reframe the issue of whether the trial court correctly found that a tax
consequence would have resulted if she had purchased more shares of Sears stock; she
attempts to turn the legal challenge into a challenge of the trial court's findings of fact.
Ms. Covey miscites two cases, Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, <J2, 20 P.3d 332, and State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), by citing them for the proposition that
"[m]itigation is a question of fact, and is also subject to deferential review." (Appellee
Br. at 5.) Neither of these cases discusses mitigation at all. Furthermore, Ms. Covey
misrepresents the third case cited she cites for this proposition, Reid v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1989). Reid says only that the reasonableness of
mitigation efforts is reviewed deferentially; it does not say that whether a duty to mitigate
exists in the first place is a question of fact. Indeed, prior to its discussion of

1

Many of the trial court's legal findings were represented in its Findings of Fact,
while many of its factual findings were set forth in its Conclusions of Law; perhaps this is
why Ms. Covey suggests that the issue of what the Agreement meant should be
characterized as a finding of fact.
3

reasonableness, it resolves as a matter of law the issue of whether a duty to mitigate
existed at all. Reid, 776 P.2d at 905 (adopting the "trend rule" that landlords have a duty
to mitigate damages).2
It is undisputed that Ms. Covey made no effort to mitigate; therefore, the issue is
not whether her efforts were reasonable, but whether there was a duty to mitigate. This
question depends solely on whether a tax consequence would have resulted, and the law is
clear in Utah that whether a particular transaction would incur a tax consequence is a
legal question.3
(D)

There is no difference between the standards suggested by each party.

Ms. Covey apparently misunderstands the "substantial evidence" standard of review,
arguing that the "clear error" standard espoused by Tanner and Pena should apply. There
is no difference between these two standards.
2

Pena takes the same approach, holding in the context of the Fourth Amendment
that whether a given set of facts gives rise to a "reasonable suspicion" is a question of
law, reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. The trial court in the Covey case
below was dealing with whether a given set of facts constituted reasonable attempts to
mitigate damages. Thus, even a determination of reasonableness can be resolved as a
matter of law when there is no challenge to the facts. But reasonableness is not the issue
here (as is discussed below).
3

See e.g, Utah State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County, 780 P.2d 813, 815
(Utah 1989) (addressing the "legal question of whether [certain] real estate ... is exempt
from ad valorem property taxes"); Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT
App 372, T|6, 21 P.3d 231 (noting that the "[tax] Commission's interpretation of the tax
code is a question of law[;] accordingly, we grant the Commission's interpretation no
deference"); Nestle Holdings, Inc. v. C.I.R., 152 F.3d 83, 86 (2nd Cir. 1998) (noting that
appellate courts "review de novo questions of law concerning the tax consequences" of a
particular business transaction").
4

IIL

Ms, Covev mischaracterizes or misstates certain facts in her Brief of Appellee.

(A)

Concerning Statements of Fact Nos. 1-4: Ms. Covey's assertion that the

"in lieu thereof language of the Agreement may have created an exclusive remedy only
"under the particular and limited circumstance that Noel Milner Covey's stock was lost
due to a margin call on Almon Milner Covey's account" (Appellee Br. at 6-7) is a
conclusion of law, not a statement of fact, and is incorrect as shown both in the Brief of
Appellant and herein, below.
(B)

Concerning Statements of Fact Nos. 5-10: Ms. Covey admits that she

took possession of Walker Lane Sale proceeds, but denies that the proceeds were
"somehow a resolution of the dispute." (Appellee Br. at 7.) This, too, is a conclusion of
law rather than a statement of fact, because the legal significance of her acceptance of the
Walker Lane Sale proceeds depends on how the Agreement is read (and, specifically,
whether it contemplated that the proceeds (if received) would be "in lieu" of the stock.
(C)

Concerning Statements of Fact Nos. 12-16: Ms. Covey alleges that Mr.

Covey's Statements of Fact Nos. 12-16 are "at least partially inaccurate" (Appellee Br. at
7), but does not contradict any of these facts as set forth by Mr. Covey. Instead, she adds
certain facts. (Appellee Br. at 7-11.) One of these facts, numbered 12 in her Brief of
Appellee, states that Ms. Covey withdrew her request for a jury trial "after the trial court
entered Almon Milner Covey's default." (Appellee Br. at 11.) However, the issues of
whether Ms. Covey would withdraw her jury demand and whether Mr. Covey had
5

"waived" his right to a jury trial were not resolved until after the default had been set
aside: only then did the parties "conclude^ that there would not be a jury trial in this case
and [the court] excused us[.]" (R. at 1023, Tr. at 12,1. 1-5 (emphasis added).)4
IVo

Ms. Covey fails to adequately rebut each of the six assignments of error set
forth by Mr. Covey in his Brief of Appellant
(A)

Ms. Covey's argument that Mr„ Covey was not entitled to a jury trial is
not persuasive.
(1)

The fact that one of the remedies sought by Ms. Covey was specific
performance does not affect Mr. Covey's right to have a jury resolve
all disputed issues of fact.

The fact that specific performance was one of the remedies sought by Ms. Covey
does not affect the parties' right to trial by jury. See e.g. Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d
67 (Utah 1998) (reviewing case where jury trial decided issues of fact and court decided
whether specific performance was warranted); Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936
P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming jury verdict against party who sought specific
performance). Moreover, Ms. Covey sought other remedies not equitable in nature and,
prior to the withdrawal of her jury demand, never sought to have the issue of specific
performance severed from the jury trial. See Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713, 715

4

Although the quoted language represents that of counsel for Mr. Covey, the
Court agreed with his description of events. (R. at 1023; Tr. at 12,1. 7.) Indeed, any
discussion of a jury waiver after default had been entered would have been irrelevant.
With a default in effect, no trial was necessary at all. This is discussed in greater detail
below.
6

(Utah 1981) (noting proper resolution of case involving both equitable and legal issues
may be severance., where plaintiff insists upon a jury trial for legal claims).
Ms. Covey's apparent position is that plaintiffs can avoid the possibility of a jury
trial simply by asking for an equitable remedy; but she cites no case law in support of
such a radical position. Such a position runs contrary to the well-established principle
that parties are entitled to have a jury of their peers resolve the issues of fact that inhere in
any case; the court's function is to apply those facts to the law. Mr. Covey is entitled to
have a jury resolve all issues of fact that exist in this case. Only when those issues are
resolved does the court's equitable power to order specific performance come into play.
It should not be forgotten that Ms. Covey herself demanded a jury trial in this case.
(2)
When the trial court set aside Mr. Covey's default, the parties were
returned to the "status quo ante".
Ms. Covey makes much of the fact that she withdrew her jury request after the
court entered default against Mr. Covey; but this argument works in Mr. Covey's favor.
The trial court's decision to set aside (or, as Ms. Covey describes it, "withdraw") the
default (Appellee Br. at 11; R. at 1023, Tr. at 10-11, 14-16, 22-25) entered against Mr.
Covey for his tardiness at the pre-trial conference mandates that the parties be returned to
the status quo ante. Erickson v. Schenkers Intl Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149
(Utah 1994). This means the parties must be returned to the status they enjoyed prior to
the entry of default. As Ms. Covey has insisted, the trial court found a waiver of her jury
demand only "after the trial court had entered [Mr.] Covey's default, [when] Noel Milner
7

Covey withdrew her request for a jury trial[.]" Thus, the "status quo ante" is a point prior
to Ms. Covey's withdrawal of her jury demand—a point at which no party had been found
to have waived, consented to the withdrawal of, or withdrawn its jury demand.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989), cited by Ms. Covey, is
inapplicable to the case at bar because it involved a default judgment that was never set
aside. The language quoted by Ms. Covey from Arnica that "the consent requirement of
Utah R. Civ. P. 38(d) does not apply once default has been entered" (Appellee Br. at 18
(citing Arnica^ 768 P.2d at 963)) does not apply to situations where the default is set aside.
Otherwise, the order setting aside default would not return the parties to the "status quo
ante" and the Utah Supreme Court's "status quo ante" language from Erickson (882 P.2d
at 1149) would be rendered meaningless.
(3)

Mr. Covey's failure to prepare jury instructions is irrelevant; in any
event, such failure is not grounds for imposing, without warning,
such a severe sanction as the trial court's finding of "waiver".

The trial court expressly noted that it would not fault Mr. Covey for failing to
prepare jury instructions (R. at 1023, Tr0 at 24,1. 18-20); therefore, his failure to prepare
jury instructions is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal. In any event, under these
circumstances it was error as well as abuse of discretion for the trial court to find waiver
because (a) Mr. Covey clearly manifested his intent to secure a jury trial, and (b) a much
less drastic and more appropriate remedy was available to the trial court (e.g. an order that
Mr. Covey not be allowed to propose any jury instructions). A finding of waiver of the

8

right to a jury was a punishment that did not fit the discovery "crime" of failing to prepare
proposed jury instructions. Furthermore,, Mr. Covey's failure to have jury instructions
prepared the day of trial was due to the trial court's prior ruling that he had waived his
right to a trial by jury. Preparation of jury instructions under such circumstances would
have been a futile gesture, not to mention a waste of time and money.5
Ms. Covey's position seems to be that Mr. Covey should have filed a jury demand
before she withdrew her own jury demand. In footnote 5 of her Brief, she states that Mr.
Covey's reason for not filing jury instructions (i.e. that it would have been a futile
gesture) "supports the [idea] that Almon Milner Covey was defaulted and/or had waived
his right to a jury trial before he filed his separate jury trial demand, making his demand
was [sic] untimely." (Appellee Br. at 19 n.5 (emphasis in original).) It is undisputed that
the trial court found that Mr. Covey waived his right to a jury trial and was defaulted
before he filed his written jury trial demand; this is not the issue. The issue is whether the
trial court erred in finding that he had consented to the withdrawal of Ms. Covey's jury
demand in the first place. If it was "untimely" for Mr. Covey to file a jury demand less
than 24 hours after the trial court's erroneous finding that he had "waived" it, there is no
such thing as "timely." Mr. Covey has already pointed out that parties are entitled to rely
on other parties' jury demands. (Appellant Br. at 8-9.) This concept is black-letter law
which has not been challenged by Ms. Covey in her Brief.
5

As already mentioned, the trial court said it would not fault Mr. Covey for his failure to
prepare jury instructions. (R. at 1023, Tr. at 24,1. 18-20.)
9

The case law cited by Ms. Covey is inapplicable here. Grant v. City of Los
Angeles, 19 F.3d 27 (Table), 1994 WL 46313, ** 1 (9th Cir. 1994), involved parties who
had been expressly warned that a failure to prepare jury instructions would result in
waiver of that party's jury demand. In fact, Grant cited another case (noted in the very
quotation utilized by Ms. Covey—see Appellee Br. at 21), Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d
1362, 1372 (9th Cir. 1981), which held that "a jury trial should not have been denied
where [the party arguing against waiver] had no warning of this severe sanction." Grant,
1994 WL 46313 at ** 1. Mr. Covey had no warning, express or implied, that his failure to
arrive at the pre-trial conference with jury instructions might result in a complete waiver
of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Therefore, even under the cases cited by Ms.
Covey, such a severe sanction was inappropriate.
Ms. Covey cites Rule 16 as if it gives the trial court carte blanche to order any
sanction for a failure to adhere to discovery orders. {See Appellee Br. at 22.) Rule 16
gives the trial court discretion to consider the appropriate sanction—discretion which can
be abused if the trial court orders a sanction that is inconsistent with the gravity of the
failure to comply. Without warning that such a severe sanction would result, the trial
court's finding constituted an abuse of its discretion under Rule 22. As Mr. Covey has
pointed out already, the trial court did not fault him for his failure to provide jury
instructions. (R. at 1023, Tr. at 24,1. 18-20.)

10

Finally, Ms. Covey argues that Mr. Covey "waived his right to a jury trial by
failing to object to the trial court's unequivocal Minute Entry that the trial would be to the
bench, and not a jury." (Appellee Br. at 22.) She again cites Aspenwood (2003 UT App.
28, TJ34), which does not apply to this situation because the party in that case failed to
object to the court's minute entry until the day of trial. Here, Mr. Covey registered his
objection immediately, both through arguments made on his behalf by Mr. Keller (i.e.
CRS) at the pre-trial hearing and through his filing of a written jury demand the next day.
If Ms. Covey is suggesting that Mr. Covey's written demand was titled inappropriately
and should have been entitled "Objection to Minute Entry" or some such delineation, she
is suggesting that this Court create a startling new example of form over substance. If
filing a written jury demand within 24 hours of the court's erroneous finding that Mr.
Covey had waived his jury demand is not an "objection" to that finding, Mr. Covey is at a
loss as to what is.
Ms. Covey argues that Mr. Covey should have "file[d] a motion challenging the
trial court's ruling at the pre-trial conference... [or] filefd] a motion requesting a hearing
on the issue." (Appellee Br. at 24.) He should have "prepare[d] or exchange[d] jury
instructions" or "appear[ed] on the day of trial with prepared jury instructions." (Id.) Mr.
Covey was not required to file a formal motion registering his objection to the trial court's
erroneous finding that he had waived his jury demand; Ms. Covey has not and cannot cite
any authority for this proposition. Mr. Covey registered his objection loud and clear (1)

11

at the pre-trial hearing through counsel, though not yet formally retained, (2) by his
written jury demand, filed the next day, and (3) on the first day of trial. There was oral
argument on the matter (at the pre-trial conference and at trial), and the trial court
erroneously ruled against Mr. Covey. And finally, Mr. Covey cannot have been expected
to—and was not expected to—bring jury instructions to trial after having had the issue
resolved against him prior to trial. Ms. Covey's arguments are all without merit.6
It should be emphasized once again that a finding of "waiver" was improper
because the trial court was required to find that Mr. Covey "consented to the withdrawal"
by Ms. Covey of her jury demand. Whether Mr. Covey "waived" his jury demand was
not the proper inquiry. The trial court never found that Mr. Covey consented to the
withdrawal by Ms. Covey of her jury demand. In fact, the trial court affirmatively stated
that if the last sentence of Paragraph D [of Rule 38] is read to mean that [the relying
parties' jury demand] can only be withdrawn after—after one party has demanded it, by
both parties consenting, then I acknowledge for the record that the defendant has not
consented[.]" (R. at 1023, Tr. at 23,1. 6-9.) Therefore, the trial court erred by finding

6

Ms. Covey's argument in footnote 10 that it would be "form over function" to
"allow a party to avoid a bench trial in all circumstances, simply by refusing to agree"
might be true but is indisputably the law. Parties by their conduct may manifest an intent
not to proceed with a jury trial, and therefore either to "waive" that right (such as by not
requesting it in the first place) or to consent to another party's withdrawal of a jury trial.
However, it is absolutely the law that a party may avoid a bench trial "simply by refusing
to agree." Once a jury trial has been demanded, all parties may rely on it and cannot be
found to relinquish that right except by an affirmative manifestation of an intent to
relinquish it.
12

"waiver" where "waiver" was not the proper inquiry, and in denying Mr. Covey his right
to a jury trial.
(B)

Ms. Covey misunderstands the express language of the Loan
Accommodation Agreement, as well as the implications of that
language on the instant case.

Mr. Covey's defenses of accord and satisfaction, election of remedies, and
estoppel were rejected for one determinative reason: the trial court's misinterpretation of
the Loan Accommodation Agreement. Ms. Covey asserts that "the plain language of the
Loan Accommodation Agreement... contemplated only one circumstance by which the
"in lieu o f language would become effective" and cites Paragraph 1 of the Agreement to
support this contention. (Appellee Br. at 26-27.) Her assertion is wrong, and Paragraph 1
says no such thing. Paragraph 1 stands only for the proposition that a margin call would
be beyond the parties' power to control, and provides "all of the remedies set forth in this
Agreement" in the event of a margin call. In other words, it provides a remedy for the
loss of the Sears stock due to a margin call7 but does not address the question of whether
a remedy is available for any other failure to return the Sears stock. If Mr. Covey failed
to return the stock for any reason other than a margin call, Ms. Covey was protected but
not by Paragraph 1. Instead, Paragraph 5 addressed her remedy in the event of any other

7

In fact, the language of Paragraph 1 suggests that the parties did not even
consider the loss of the stock due to a margin call to be a "breach" of the Agreement; it is
perhaps for this reason (i.e. that a margin call was not a "breach") that the parties
considered it necessary to state that Ms. Covey would have "all of the remedies set forth
in this Agreement" in the event of a margin call
13

failure to return the securities: "In the event Borrower fails to return the Securities and
pay the Loan Obligation ... Borrower shall be entitled to take title to the real property in
lieu thereof...." (R. at 10.) In addition, Paragraph 4 of the Agreement contemplated any
failure to return the Sears stock by providing for a $1000.00 per day penalty "[i]n the
event Borrower does not return the securities." Thus, the Agreement clearly
contemplated and provided a remedy for any failure to return the securities, and the trial
court was wrong to suggest otherwise.
Ms. Covey correctly points out that the Agreement does not restrict her to only one
remedy. But Mr. Covey has never contended otherwise. He has merely argued that once
she accepted the Walker Lane Sale proceeds, she was made whole under the Agreement.
The trial court rejected Mr. Covey's accord and satisfaction, election of remedy, and
estoppel arguments primarily because it erroneously believed that only a margin callrelated failure to return the securities was contemplated by the Agreement. In other
words, the trial court found it determinative in rejecting Mr. Covey's affirmative defenses
that the securities were not lost due to a margin call. (R. at 1024, Tr. at 461,1. 3-12; Tr. at
502-03.) This was plainly erroneous, and is by itself grounds for reversal.
Mr. Covey challenged the trial court's rejection of his accord and satisfaction
defense by arguing that such rejection was based on its misunderstanding of the terms of
the Agreement. Ms. Covey attempts to turn this legal issue (i.e. interpretation of the
Agreement) into an issue of fact by arguing that the trial court made "clear and
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unequivocal findings of fact... directed specifically to Almon Milner Covey's defenses."
(Appellee Br. at 30.) But Mr. Covey is not challenging the trial court's factual findings.
To the extent that this Court must review the trial such findings, Mr. Covey agrees that
"substantial deference" is appropriate. But the trial court's conclusions of law were
founded almost entirely upon a faulty legal premise: that the Agreement only anticipated
one type of failure to return the Sears stock.
Ms„ Covey would like this Court to believe (like the trial court did, incredibly) that
she entered into an Agreement in which she gave up more than a quarter million dollars
worth (at that time) of stock, knew foil well that there could be many reasons why she
might never see the stock again, and yet insisted on collateral only in case the stock was
not returned due to a margin call—leaving herself entirely unsecured if the stock was lost
for any other reason. Ms. Covey essentially said, "Here, Alvin, take my stock. I want
your house as collateral if you lose it due to a margin call, but no collateral at all if you
lose it due to any other reason." To believe this was legal error because of the obviously
contradictory express language of the Agreement, which the trial court ignored or
misunderstood; and in any event, it was an abuse of discretion because it was not
supported by substantial evidence (Ms. Covey's testimony is not "substantial" when
weighed against the language of the Agreement).
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(C)

The issue of whether a duty to mitigate exists turns on the legal
question of whether a tax consequence would have resulted.

Ms. Covey cites the wrong standard concerning her duty to mitigate damages.
Once a duty to mitigate has been established, she correctly argues that the damaged party
is only required to take reasonable steps to mitigate. (Appellee Br. at 35.) However, the
trial court's determination of whether any steps must be taken or, in other words, whether
there exists a duty to mitigate at all, is a question of law which must be resolved before an
inquiry into reasonableness is even relevant. See e.g. Welsh v. Anderson, All N.W.2d
426 (Neb. 1988) (noting that whether doctrine of mitigation of damages applies in a
particular set of circumstances—in that case, whether it applies to the use of seatbelts—is
a question of law); People ex rel Bourne v. Johnson, 199 N.E.2d 68, 72 (111. App. 1 Dist.
1964) (resolving as a matter of law the question of whether earnings from moonlighting
job should be considered in mitigation of damages caused by wrongful termination). In
this case it is undisputed that Ms. Covey did nothing to mitigate her damages. The trial
court concluded that this was reasonable under the circumstances only because it believed
that she would have incurred a detriment (in the form of a tax consequence) if she would
have acted to mitigate her damages (by purchasing replacement shares) (R. at 623, F. of
F. 68; R. at 631-32, C. of L. 18-19).
Furthermore, Ms. Covey has not answered in her Brief of Appellee Mr. Covey's
contention that without its finding that a tax consequence would have resulted, the trial
court's conclusion that Ms. Covey acted reasonably in failing to mitigate her damages is
16

without factual jusLiiication. Without (initial jiisdik.iiiuii Clin li il ouil

t/onclusioii

I

must be reversed. Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank, 673 P. 2d 590 601 (1 Hah 1Q81V
!

Anderson v. Utah County Bd ofComm'rs, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1979). Since she
hits not answered this contention, she lias waived her right to contest it See e.g. ArtesRoyv. City of Aspen ?l I' lil 9SK %(l n I i|i0!,l(1if„ {^hWiaUwyJihtlsov v Harem. /4.
R2d 1237, 1244 (IOl!,Cir. 1984), for its holding that "failure to address contenti n in
appellate brief waives issue).
I

Ms* Covey's attempt to minimize the obvious and substantial
eontradietions in the trial court's factual findings is transparent; the
findings constitute clear error and cannot be sustained.

Ms. Covey argues, incredibly, that the trial court's findimheld the Walker Lane Sale proceeds as collateral for further performance b> Mr. Co\e>,
si

(

- -„* • ^iiw i .J * una there was no

agreement surrounding Ms. Covey's receipt M\\\ retenliuii I llu prou'eds. an; "entirely
consistent[.]" (Appellee Br at 1^4 I.) She blends them into one amorphous finding thiiI
Ms Covey "only agreed to allovv uic sale of the Walker Lane Property if the proceeds
would be held hv lin in IIKMI IIMI ihis process was never intenccu *A aie pam^ tr
constitute Noel Milner Covey's sole and only remedy un*KM the I « n. \<vonimnd:iliiii
Agreement, and that the funds were held while the parties tried to resolve the dispute... ."
* - i».' •
an agreement and wuu

the proceeds were *' held b}" her in trust," that would require
i! titiiif ,s find my lluiil no such agreement
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existed. (R. at 623; F. of F. 67; Add.2.) Furthermore, Ms. Covey admits by her "sole and
only remedy" argument how critical the trial court's finding was that the Agreement did
not contemplate any failure to return the Sears stock except by virtue of a margin call.8
Ms. Covey entirely ignores Mr. Covey's point that "escrow" is a legal term that
requires the establishment, supported by the evidence of certain factual elements. The
trial court made no attempt to explain how an "escrow" could have existed. Once again,
by not answering this contention she has waived her right to contest it. See Artes-Roy, 31
F.3dat960n.l.
Mr. Covey's argument is not that the inconsistencies are per se grounds for
reversal {see Appellee Br. at 39-40 n.19), but that the inconsistencies highlight and
support his real argument: that the evidence was legally insufficient to justify the trial
court's conclusions (individually or together) that Ms. Covey's retention of the Walker
Lane Sale proceeds was covered, not by the Loan Accommodation Agreement but by
another, new, oral security agreement, by an escrow agreement, and by no agreement at
all. (Appellant Br. at 22.) Contrary to Ms. Covey's contention, Mr. Covey has marshaled
the evidence in favor of any one of these holdings. (See Appellant Br. at 21-22, listing

8

Ms. Covey further argues that Mr. Covey is attempting, by pointing out the trial
court's contradictory factual findings, "to distract the Court into departing from the
appropriate standard of review[.]" (Appellee Br. at 40-41.) The argument is curious
because Mr. Covey admits in his Statement of the Issues that his challenge to the trial
court's contradictory factual findings is governed by a "clear error" standard. (Appellant
Br. at 2-3.)
18

cighl pieeo ofeudnm v \\ in m
( \\ me a l a l in luvoi ol llicsi. holding i I he evidence is
legally insuffici en I In iiisfih (tir lii.tl < null N I nndiisinns. .mini 1I1 nm Unions should be
set aside.
(E)

Mr, Covey was not required to marshal the evidence concerning the
trial court's order of specific performance; specific performance w as
inappropriate and constituted an abuse of discretion.
(1)

The requirement that an appellant marshal the evidence mm .,-, J>
when the appellant is challenging a finding of fact.

In challenging the trial court's decision to order specific performance, Mr. Covey
is no! challenging any findings ol lact. 11c is simply challenging the t rial court's legal
conclusion.,, drawn IMIH lh< uiulispiilnl liUls llial aiionlci >i spculu performance was
appropriate. Ms. Covey cites no authority for the proposn • n M
requirement is triggered simply because this decision is reviewed for abuse ol discretion.
Pi lrthermoi c , the trial coin t did not set forth reasons justifying its decision I
specific performance, ntlin than ils findings thai the Awreeiiienl "is sul'luicnlly clear ..ind
ill"finite to be specifically enforced," that "justice requires specific en *<>•'* • -. •>
62K, C ol L. 7-8.) Therefore, Mr. Covey cannot be expected to di\ mc the e\ idence OL
wliiid the i/oiitl b a s a l lis decision

(2)

Mr, Covey's refusal to purchase replacement shares is irrelevant m
determining whether specific performance was appropriate.

Ms. Covey argues that the trial coun "squarely rejeckd .Mi. Lovey's arguments
against specific pe**" -

^UI-K.

a hMiui isai Altnnn Milner Covey refused to
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t

purchase the Sears stock in his own name, and return it to Noel Milner Covey."
(Appellee Br. at 43.) There is no citation or explanation why this refusal would justify an
order of specific performance, other than that it "placed Noel Milner Covey in the
untenable position of having to risk adverse tax consequences." (Appellee Br. at 43.)
Ms. Covey has thus identified yet another area where the trial court rested its legal
conclusion on a faulty premise; the mere fact that it erred in concluding that there would
be tax consequences from the purchase of stock (where there was no short sale) is enough
to overrule its decision to order specific performance.
Ms. Covey argues that she "cannot be faulted for not turning over more than one
million dollars in cash to her brother without adequate, written protection...." (Appellee
Br, at 44, n.21.) Yet this is exactly what she alleges Mr. Covey did. She alleges he
turned over more than one million dollars in cash without adequate, written protection.
Her argument implies that it would be crazy or ridiculous to turn over such a large amount
of money pursuant to no written agreement; Mr. Covey agrees. The Loan
Accommodation Agreement, which was misinterpreted by the trial court as a matter of
law, protected Mr. Covey because it provided that the Walker Lane property (or, as it
turned out, the proceeds from the sale of that property) would constitute Ms. Covey's
remedy if the Sears stock were lost. It is undisputed that Ms. Covey received the
proceeds into her sole possession and control; the only dispute is whether the Agreement
anticipated and therefore (at least presumptively) governed her receipt of the proceeds. If
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it governed her receipt of the procccdfi, ;m nhlrr D\ sprain 1 prrlninidnce was an abuse uf
the trial court's discretion.
^

Mr. Covey raised this issue before the trial court.
i-

- -s J against specific performance at. trial (See e.g. R, al 1024., Tr, at

458,1. ,- A 2, lr. di 462-63. >

dial i mill il <rlf mdh ih J Hi I il i J,tie on which the

stock should have been purchased by Mr. Covey—in other word

(lr dale Iron > li h

the damages to Ms. Covey (assuming .there were damages) should have been
calcula

-•>•!*

- ui ••-

"raised for the first time uu ,

.... L * *

^->p ^ Thus, this issue is not
*•,*«.;*

The securities fraud case*- cucc ~^ ..~. ~o^ *^ -to nut raise a new - .

/

bolster the arguments Mr. Covey raised at til v It iin Tour! finds that tliej do raibc a
new issue 1 I

\n ", submit^ (li.il Ilk, lh,il aunt s decision lo i ider specific performance

under the facts presented constituted plain error; tin TI :lon * (Iii;1 i (YHII I may address the
issue,. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7, In order to show plain error and thereby justify
appellate itiiel" insofar as he is found to have failed to raise the Issue below, Mr. Covey
must show "(I) an

\

I li I the err* w sin mid lia\ i: been obv ions to the trial court:;

and (iii) the error is harmful." Id. Mr. Covey submits thai Mi**t.- \\ ,i\ .inn in , injci iii|:
st^eific performance; that the error was obvious because it allowed Ms. Cove}' to «"v, *• a
-

,

.;

....•

w v. filing on her rights until she is certain that

the stock price would be vv

.;,*-*.->-
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l,.;;. :\)icu:

uiai MOU *-.

priced on a date that represents a reasonable time following breach; and that he was
harmed by the error to the tune of several hundred thousand dollars (the amount of the
price increase that occurred while Ms, Covey sat on her rights and waited).
(4)

The securities fraud cases are both relevant and applicable.

Ms. Covey's argument that the "securities fraud cases cited by Appellant have no
bearing on the facts of this case" (Appellee Br. at 45) is simply incredible. This case is
founded entirely upon a loan of securities. The damages allegedly sustained by Ms.
Covey were due to a rise in the price of a security. The securities fraud cases show how
other courts have dealt with a plaintiff who has suffered a loss involving damages which
vary from day to day because of the unique nature of securities markets.
Ms. Covey attempts to distinguish the cases cited by Mr. Covey on the weak
ground that they "involve the sale or other [stock] ownership rights" rather than a loan of
stock. (Appellee Br. at 45.) The circumstances surrounding the injury are not the point;
what matters is that the injury involves a thing (i.e. a security) which is constantly
changing in value. Ms. Covey misunderstands the purpose of the securities case law,
believing that an acceptance of Mr. Covey's securities arguments would place him in a
position of undue benefit. (Appellee Br. at 46.) Her argument assumes that it is Mr.
Covey's choice when damages should be valued; but this is untrue. The securities case
law is clear that no one except the court may choose the date on which damages in a
securities case should be calculated; some courts calculate damages from the date of
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breach, while othns i .JIUJI.IR; ihcin Irum a '''reasonable time"' alter breach, Mr. Covey's
point is thai no eourl calnihUt^ lln in hum a d He tui IUII1. ui muu allef hiiat.li

\ rl hv

ordering specific performance, the trial court did just that.
(F)

Mr. Covey's argument that the court made no finding justifying
piercing the corporate veil was not adequately rebutted by Ms. O'ovry.

Ms ' . - - . - • •

i:,\«

liable for the funcL aAui lie lost iiom her account *

.
-

wey personally
i my Hie

corporate veil theory," (Appellee Br. at 47.) Yet the trial court openly admitted that the
dut> I--clients a

, - :\i:

. -. . .

\

^vev was no greater than the dmv lie owed to his other1

.•

.1 ihermore, the trial court

expressly acknowledged Mr. Covey's relationship
her as a customer any greater or lesser, and Ilia? he dealt with her as a customer. (R. a\
1024 I r a i "^*\ I id "• i I uiali'i i hreach ol a fiduciary duty does not automatically
justify personal liabililv whnr (lie dmh rxislal unly in iln• i ml* \l ul professional
employment. A finding must first be made that the breaching parly received a personal
benefit from his breach Q There was no evidence presented at trial

: „ \_u\ ey

hi nelilled persuiiall > It i >m his alleged breach of the fiduciary duty uc ^wed to Ms. Covey

q

See e.g. In re Black, 179 B.R. 509 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (refusing to impose personal
liability for officer and majority shareholder's breach of fiduciary duty, where no personal
benefit was gained by his failure to remit the plaintiffs funds); In re Nicoll, 42 B.R, 87
*N.I)
i 984) (holding that corporate officer is personally liable to the corporation's
a I creditors where the officer or director breached his or her fiduciary duty to the
LUI porahon and received a personal benefit).,
23

Therefore, it was improper to hold Mr. Covey personally liable for acts he committed in
his capacity as an employee of Covey & Co.
Vo

Ms, Covey is not entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred on
appeal.
Ms. Covey is not automatically entitled to fees incurred on appeal simply because

there was an attorney's fee provision in the Loan Accommodation Agreement. Ms.
Covey must first "retain all [her] trial victory on appeal." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998). She cannot recovery any attorney's fee incurred in litigating
an issue on appeal on which she did not prevail. Id. The case cited by Ms. Covey,
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d406, 409 (Utah 1980), for
the proposition that a "contract provision for attorney fees includes those fees incurred on
appeal" (Appellee Br. at 49), does not apply where the party "cannot successfully defend
on appeal its recovery in the trial court." Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 596
(Utah 1997).70
Moreover, Mr. Covey does challenge the trial court's award of attorney fees and
costs, contrary to Ms. Covey's assertion. (Appellee Br. at 49.) Mr. Covey did not include
a separate issue concerning attorney's fees because he believes it is implied that a reversal
of the trial court's decision on the merits would require a reversal on its decision

10

R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997), cited by
Ms. Covey, involved attorney's fees awarded as sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the
party "fully prevailed" on appeal. Id. at 1081. R&R Energies is thus distinguishable from the
instant case.
24

concerning atiornn s Ices HIHI H ost „ I (n: attorney s kv pio\ IMOII ol Ihc Agreement does
not provide that fees awarded pursuant to a judgment th*

;

< •

recoverable, but only that the breaching party must pay "reasonable attorney's fees" to the
non-breaching party. (R. at I I I II this Court agrees with any or all of Mr, Covey's
arguments ;md the * -use is ivmmulul to tlu li i«i) umrt 01 otherwise modified, the h ml
court's basis for awarding attorney's fees would naturally be called

t

would be required to re-evaluate the propriety of such an award.

COINCM'SIOIN
Fore the foregoing reasons, Mr. Covey again asks this ("mill lor the ivlirfsel I >t lh
in his Brief of Appellant. (Appellant Br, at 32-33.)
l)ATI'1)lhis^£day ol May, 2003.
C'OHNI'

i<Aiji\'\h>i< i iv M-AJ/\I

&&h

,arry RL Keller
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed,
by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this Jcmrday of IJIVHL
> 2003, to:
JAMES E. MAGLEBY #7247
PAXTON R. GUYMON #8188
MILLER, MAGLEBY & GUYMON, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-5600
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ADDENDUM A

SUMMAR ¥ Of ARGUMENTS

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 4 ^ ( 8 ) . Mr. Covev submits the lolto Aing
Summary of Arguments:
111

i in- ip.il i tMi"< i'in 'I "M iinding Hi.*' Mi i 01 e\ I M waned His right to a jury trial.

Mr. Covey never expressly or impliedly "waived1' that right, and should have been allowed to
„).

M thermore. the trial court'4- finding ^: "waiver"

was insufficient; the court was required to find tii t V •:

. .• •

withdrawal of her jury demand. In any event. M: Co\e\ neitf- ; w-tivt-d his ri^ht TO a -^-^

uim

nor consented tti M\ (Yn'ey's nillidiawal ttf liu (iiiv demand I lis counsel, though not yet
formally retained at the time of the hearing where waiver was found, was pres^
ven cJc;ii to Hie irial judge that Mi", i'ovey did not intend to waive his right to a iur\ m<:
(2)-

The trial court misinterpreted basic terms oi lhc I tun V nunmodiilinn Agreement

(the "'Agreement"), and. relied on those misinterpreted terms to justify its Conclusions of Law.
First, despite broad I,MI filiate in fir Vyivcmepl M
| >\ idmg a remedy loi any failure by Mr. Covey
to timely return the securities (the "Sears stock") he borrowed under the Agreement,
court erroneously

.i me Agreement only provided for a failure to timely return the V n-

stock due to a margin call. Such an interpretation \NMUId hiIM J. IT M, ' . vn .. u mi\h u e.
no ability to take title to the Walker Lane Property pledged as collateral for the Sears stock under
the Agreement) if Mr. C

<»

*•

u. :iii*^ wine ...an a margin

call. Second, despite unambiguous latu:uaoe in ill- Agi oemem didt title lo the Vvalkv
Property would be conv

.

e

or me Sears stock if there were a failure to umeh retui P

the stock, the court found that Ms. Covey *s acccpuru <
1

s

"

• <•*

i

,..,

ceeds meant

nothing under the Agreemenl .iinl Jul m I m oibjiiliik; ati accord and satisfaction or an election of
remedies
I In: ih KII court erred in finding that Ms, Covey would have incurred a tax
consequence if she used the Walker Lam1 Sale pioceeds in pmchase leplacenient shares of Sears
stock, Its finding was erroneous because there was no evidence offered establishing how a lax
consequence »"< ""1*1 h » * resulted Irum «in M a naiisactioii, ' I his error was compounded when the
trial court relied on its conclusion that a tax consequence wr
"Kh (\ n ev nad no duty to mitigate her damages, The court's finding that there was no iuu ,
mitigate was founded upon its conclusion ilnf r4»« would litis i

MKMI>

in" a lax consequence had

she attempted to mitigate her damages by purchasing replacement shares of Sears stock.
(4)

The iri.il (. ouii ciu/il in Iuiding thai Ms. Covey held the Walker Lane Sale

proceeds as "collateral," as "escrow1 ," and pursuant to no ayrcvmonl

I ll|ll-v Vi'vl'np- au

inconsistent with one another; and in any event, none of them is supported bv the record. The
trial court's finding that Ms. Covev nxvh cxi tlr proceeds as "collateral is clcarlv erroneous
because a is essential h a purported oral security agreement which directly contradicts (lie
Lmiiiiai * 'f 'h*r \ v - * *

vas expressly agreed (in writing) that Ms, Covey's

receipt oi the Walker Lane propem (01 the proceeds from, its salt" HilK'i

n,,

c O*' "'"H » \\A> vvc'l!1

more limn !In; Sears stock at the tunc) would occur "in lieu" of the Sears stock. The finding that
M.s. Covey received the proceeds pursuant lo an escrow agt'eeniuil is elcarlv erroneous for the
same reason, as well as because an interested party could not have held the proceeds in uesn*i"««,
The finding that Ms C 'ove> t r a i \ i, d lln: proceeds pursuant to no agreement at all is clearly
erroneous because it belies the first two findings, contradicts flic icnii1. nl I|IC \grwmenl, is not
2

supported by substantial evidnifi< when marshilcd, and makes no logical sense.
rr

^

The trial court erred in ordering specific performnniv hn .nist Ms (\

• / it

if1 ivk " :IIM i lines, i ompieie and toial control ol the Walker Lane Sale proceeds. If she had
- :j v\\ il i niiiedtakl) land then sued foi

wanted her Sears stock replaced, she could I

damages if it turned out that a tax consequence could somehow have resulted); she also ooul'l
have invested the monrv in w iiknlii.il luinl i nlher conservative investment vehicle so Vmr* i.i *•
funds would not remain idle Instc.td, she chose to "wait aiu*

"

:

• -u s

iloek ^Mi'iil HI i Ji iwn before filing a lawsuit. Parties to a conflict m\ oh mg securities transfers
are not allowed to profit from a ddn\ in seeking ,i claim ii" \n\vv to Inst determine whether the
investment will prove to be unprofitable, Ms. Covey did exactly that when she delayed iiliii] lior
lawsuit until shr k .

. • . - . - . aiu..;,-^, i hercioic. the appropriate remedy

(assuming there is liability at all) could not have been specific ivrinnniimr; damages should
I I.I i been ialculated based on the stock price on the date when Ms. Covey should have
purchased the replacement stock.
(6)

Finally, the trial court erred in piercing the corporate veil and finding Mi < <
' «\ ,

personally liable fo

-

jut were transferred out of Ms. Covey's account at

Covey & Co. This tindinn constitute^ *»rror because the e

was

tin allot i"|i,i» 14'( 'i )\ i;\ >Al 1 Yh, or that the observance of the corporate form would sanction a
fraud, promote injustice, or cause an in- r

in.jni^s a* justification

ol a decision to pierce the corporate veil, such a decision is plainly erroneous.
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ADDENDUM B

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that Mr. Covey had impliedly
"waived" his constitutional right to jury trial by arriving late at a pretrial hearing?

Standard of review: "Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law
which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial
court's interpretation." State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[5, 34 P.3d 790.
Preservation of issue: at pretrial conference, where bench trial was scheduled over
the objections of CRS (friend-of-court counsel for Mr. Covey) (R. at 1023, Tr. at 8,1. 810; Tr. at 10,1. 18-21; R. at 443); the next day, when Mr. Covey filed a jury demand (R.
at 445); and on the first day of trial, when Mr. Covey asked the court to reconsider its
decision that he had ("waived") his right to trial by jury (R. at 1023, Tr. at 23,1. 3-9).
2.

Did the trial court misinterpret basic terms in the Loan
Accommodation Agreement, and then rely on the misunderstood terms
in drawing its Conclusions of Law?

Standard of review: "The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question
of law which does not require any particular deference to the trial court's interpretation of
the contract." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
Preservation of issue: at trial, where Mr. Covey argued that the Agreement
contemplated and provided a remedy for any failure to return the securities (R. at 1024,
Tr. at 459,1. 8-16), and that the language of the Loan Accommodation Agreement was
"critical" to its resolution of the case (R. at 1024, Tr. at 454,1. 14-15).
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that a tax consequence would have
occurred had Ms, Covey used the Walker Lane Sale proceeds to
repurchase Sears shares, and then in relying on this erroneous legal
conclusion to find that she had no duty to mitigate her damages, and
was not estopped from claiming such damages?

Standard of review: whether a particular transaction would incur a tax
consequence is a legal question (Utah State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County, 780
P.2d 813,815 (Utah 1989), and therefore its consideration at trial is entitled to no
deference and is reviewed for correctness (Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n,
2000 UT App 372, T|6,21P.3d 231).

Preservation of issue: at trial, where Mr. Covey testified that he was so certain that
a tax consequence would not result that he offered to pay the taxes, if any were incurred.
(R. at 1024, Tr. at 320,117-18.)
4.

Did the trial court err in finding (1) that Ms. Covey held the Walker
Lane Sale proceeds as collateral for further performance by Mr,
Covey, (2) that the proceeds were "held in escrow" by Ms. Covey, and
(3) that there was no agreement surrounding Ms. Covey's receipt and
retention of the Walker Lane Sale proceeds?

Standard of review: "[Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard[.]" Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, f 16,15 P.3d 1021.
Preservation of issue: at trial, where Mr. Covey argued that Ms. Covey agreed to
use the Walker Lane Sale proceeds to purchase replacement shares of Sears stock (R. at
1024; Tr. at 307-08.), and where Mr. Covey drew the court's attention to the language of
the Loan Accommodation Agreement, stating that the language was "critical." (R. at
1024, Tr. at 454,1. 14-15.)
5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering specific
performance?

Standard of review: "Specific performance as a remedy will stand and will not be
upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,
1fl6, 15P.3dl021.
Preservation of issue: at trial, where Mr. Covey argued against specific
performance. (R. at 1024, Tr. at 458,1. 7-12; Tr. at 462-63.)
6.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Mr. Covey should be
personally liable for the $55,000.00 in funds that were transferred out
of Ms. Covey's account at Covey & Co.?

Standard of review: "For purposes of appellate review, the trial court's decision to
pierce the corporate veil will be upheld if there is substantial evidence in favor of the
judgment." Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, Tfl6, 15 P.3d 1021.
Preservation of issue: at trial, where Mr. Covey argued that the corporate veil
should not be pierced. (R. at 1024, Tr. at 258-58.)

